SCHOOL INPUTS AND EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES IN NORTH CAROLINA: COMPARISON OF STATIC AND DYNAMIC ANALYSES by Walden, Michael L. & Sisak, Mark R.
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 31,3(December 1999):593–609
0 1999 SouthernAgricultural Economics Association
School Inputs and Educational Outcomes in
North Carolina: Comparison of Static and
Dynamic Analyses
Michael L. Walden and Mark R. Sisak
ABSTRACT
The relationshipbetween studentachievement and school inputshas long been a subject
of academic research. The general conclusion of pastresearch is thatschool inputs, such
as the number of teachers relative to pupils, has little impact on studentacademic out-
comes. This paper provides a fresh look at this issue. Seventeen alternative measures of
student performance in North Carolina school districts are related to a wide array of school
policy inputs and socioeconomic characteristics of students and their families. Both static
and dynamic analyses are performed. The key findings are (1) the school policy inputs
significantly related to student achievement vary by the measure of student achievement
used, (2) the joint contribution of school policy inputs to student achievement is relatively
small, and (3) the results differ between the static and dynamic analyses; in particular,
changes in the number of teachers relative to the number of pupils in the district have a
much stronger association with student achievement in the dynamic analysis.
Key Words: public education, student achievement.
For several years there has been widespread
concern about improving performance in the
public schools. The concern is based on a na-
tional decline in average Scholastic Aptitude
Test (SAT) scores, especially math scores,
since the early 1960s, although some recovery
was made in the 1980s (U.S. Department of
Education, 1993). Less controversial measures
of school performance, such as the National
Assessment of Educational Progress, show the
same trends.’
Michael L. Walden is professor, Department of Agri-
cultural and Resource Economics, and Mark R. Sisak
is a former Research Assistan~ Graduate Program in
Economics, North Carolina State University, Raleigh,
North Carolina.
1The National Assessment of Educational Progress
(NAEP) tests are prefemed measures of student per-
formance because they are based on a representative
In Southern states the concern about edu-
cational performance is enhanced because
leaders see education as a development tool
which can improve the relative social and eco-
nomic standing of the rural regions. Although
progress has been made, most Southern states
still lag behind the nation in per-capita in-
come, average wages, and other socioeconom-
ic measures. Leaders see educational improve-
ment as the road to economic and social
advancement.
As the literature review will reveal, a large
body of research examining what policymak-
ers can do to improve educational outcomes
exists. One of the themes of this research is
that school inputs, and particularly the teacher/
pupil ratio, have little impact on educational
sample of students at different ages (Congressional
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outcomes. Yet many of these studies suffer
from an extended “omitted variables” prob-
lem. It is very difficult to control for all the
factors, especially innate student characteris-
tics, that affect school performance.
One way to handle the omitted variables
problem in school performance studies is to
conduct a dynamic analysis rather than a static
analysis. The most common study estimates
the relationships between student outcomes
and school inputs using a cross section of data
from many schools or districts at a point in
time. We call this a static analysis (other re-
searchers call it a “level” analysis). In a static
analysis it is crucial to include as many control
variables as possible so that parameter esti-
mates are unbiased.
A dynamic analysis utilizes input and out-
come data from schools and districts over time.
Changes in outcome measures are related to
changes in inputs (some researchers call this a
“value-added” analysis). In this case, omitting
variables such as the innate characteristics of
students is not as worrisome for two reasons.
First, the effects of their “levels” on these
characteristics will be captured by the initial
level of student achievement. Second, in a dy-
namic analysis it is the changes in innate char-
acteristics that are omitted. As long as the in-
nate student characteristics and the geographic
definition of the school districts change little,
then the omission of innate characteristics will
have little impact on the analysis.
The contribution of this paper to the liter-
ature on school inputs and educational out-
comes is the comparison of results derived
from a static analysis and dynamic analysis. In
particular, do the results for key input factors,
such as the number of teachers relative to pu-
pils, change when moving from a static anal-
ysis to a dynamic analysis? Can the failure to
use a dynamic analysis in most studies explain
the lack of significance of key school input
variables?
There are other important features of the
paper. First, the study uses data at the school
district level, where most control and decision-
making about school inputs reside. Second,
the study uses 17 measures of educational out-
comes. Third, the study includes an extensive
collection of both human and capital school
inputs. Last, the study explicitly considers the
issue of how much collective impact school
inputs have on educational outcomes.
The paper is structured into five sections.
The next section reviews the literature exam-
ining linkages between school inputs and ed-
ucational performance of students. The third
section presents the static and dynamic models
of the educational production function. The
data used to implement the models and the
empirical results are discussed in Section Four.
Conclusions, implications, and recommendat-
ions are offered in the last section.
Previous Work
The examination of the relationship between
student performance and school inputs began
with the Coleman report in 1966. Since then,
scores of articles and research reports have
been published on the topic. Studies have been
conducted in almost every conceivable way.
Cross section and time series analyses have
been performed. The unit of analysis has in-
cluded individual students, individual schools,
and school districts.
Hanushek (1986) provides an excellent re-
view of 147 of these studies. The most telling
conclusion of his review is the inconsistency
of findings regarding school policy variables.
Variables such as the teacher/pupil ratio,
teacher education, and expenditures per pupil
were largely found to have no impact on stu-
dent performance. For example, in the 112
studies which included the teacher/pupil ratio,
Hanushek reports that only nine found a sta-
tistically significant positive linkage to student
performance. Similarly, in the 65 studies
which included expenditures per pupil, only
13 found a positive and statistically significant
tie to student output.
In contrast, Hanushek found a strong tie
between socioeconomic characteristics of stu-
dents’ backgrounds and student achievement
in the studies. In particular, students whose
parents have more income or more education
tend to perform better in school.
Since Hanushek’s review, additional stud-
ies have examined the effect of administrativeWalden and Sisak: School Inputs and Educational Outcomes 595
control on student achievement. Dowries and
Horowitz (1995) examined whether moving
resource control from the district level to the
building level had any impact on student per-
formance in Chicago schools. They found
these changes had little impact on student
achievement after accounting for student and
neighborhood characteristics.
Anderson, Shughart, and Tollison (1991)
focused on potential negative impacts of
school bureaucracies on student performance.
They speculated that increases in the number
of school bureaucrats, or administrators, and
in their spending may reduce student output
by creating more rules, paperwork, and work-
shops for teachers to add to their busy sched-
ules. Such work substitutes for classroom time
and preparation by teachers and thereby re-
duces successful achievement by students. The
authors found support for their theory by find-
ing that increases in non-teaching staff and
spending were associated with lower student
achievement.
Ballou and Podgursky (1997) found no
positive relationship between teacher pay and
student performance. They attribute this find-
ing to the structure of public schools, which
generally provides across-the-board pay raises
rather than raises tied directly to performance.
Finally, Ferguson and Ladd (1995) have
added to the debate about the influence of the
teacher/pupil ratio on student performance. In
their study of Alabama schools they found
smaller class sizes were consistently related to
improved student test scores. However, they
did not control for the effects of non-instruc-
tional spending.
The variation in findings for the education
production function and the inconsistent find-
ings for school policy variables indicate it is
risky to apply findings from other studies to a
region or state of interest. In addition, no work
has been done comparing results for the same
data set for a static analysis and a dynamic
analysis.
ModeIs
We use a standard production function model
to analyze the determination of student
achievement. The model relates a measure of
student achievement, A, to a series of school
policy inputs, X, and a set of socioeconomic
characteristics of the student and student’s
family, Z:
(1) A = f(X, Z).
Typically, student achievement, A, is mea-
sured by standardized test scores. The school
policy inputs are usually measured on a per-
pupil basis, such as teachers per pupil, admin-
istrators per pupil, and spending per pupil. The
socioeconomic characteristics are often the in-
come and education of students’ parents and
any special characteristics of students.
Focusing on the school policy inputs, equa-
tion (1) can be rewritten as:
(2) A = f(xllp, xJp, . . . . x.lp,
z,/p, z2@, . . . , Z,lp)
where xl, x2, . . . . Xnare individual school pol-
icy inputs such as total number of teachers,
total number of administrators, and total
spending, p is total number of pupils, and z{,
z~, ..., Znare individual socioeconomic char-
acteristics.
Taking the log of the dependent variable
and of the input ratios and expressing equation
(2) in log-linear form yields:
(3) in(A) = al(ln xl) + a,(ln x,) + . . ~an(lnXn)
–(a, +a, +.an)lnp
+ bl(ln z,) + bz(ln Z2)
+ . . . bn(lnZn)
–(bl+b, +,. bJlnp, or
(4) in(A) = a,(ln x,) + a,(ln X2) + . . . an(lnx,,)
+ b,(ln z,) + b2(ln Z2)
+ . . . bn(lnZn)
–(a, +a, +.an+b, +b,
+ ~. ~b,,)ln p.
Note in equation (4)’s formulation that the im-
pact of the number of pupils (p) is estimated596 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1999
separately from the impacts of the school pol-
icy inputs and socioeconomic characteristics.
However, our results are still comparable to
those where school policy inputs, such as the
number of teachers, are measured on a per-
pupil basis (i.e., the teacher/pupil ratio). For
example, in equation (4), assume the school
policy input xl is the number of teachers.
Then, the coefficient al measures the effect of
a change in the (log of the) number of teachers
on student achievement, holding all other in-
puts and the number of pupils constant, That
is, al measures the effect of changing the
teacher/pupil ratio by changing the number of
teachers and leaving the number of pupils un-
changed.
Since there are three years of data for each
school district, we have the ability to conduct
a dynamic analysis. The dynamic analysis ex-
amines the relationship between changes in
student achievement measures and changes in
inputs. Many researchers consider dynamic
analysis to be superior to static analysis be-
cause the inability to measure innate student
characteristics is not as much of a problem
when examining changes in output measures.
In deriving the dynamic estimating equa-
tion, consider first the equations for the deter-
mination of achievement in the same school
district in two time periods, t and t + 1:
(5) A, = a,X, 1P, + b,Z, 1P,,
(6) A,+, = at+,X~+,/p~+l + b~+lZ~+,/p,+l,
where, for simplicity, X now stands for all
school policy inputs and Z stands for all so-
cioeconomic inputs. If we assume the produc-
tion functions are the same in both time peri-
ods, that is, ~ = ~+1 = a and b, = b~+l = b,
then the difference in achievement scores be-
tween the two time periods is:
(7) A,+, - A, = a(X,+, /p,+, – X,/p,)
+ b(Z~+,/p,+, – z,/p,).
Taking the log of scores and input ratios and
then expressing the difference in the achieve-
ment scores gives:
(8) in A,+, – in A,
= c(ln Xt+l – in X,) + d(ln Z,+, – in Z,)
– c(ln p~+l)+ c(ln pJ – d(ln p~+l)
+ d(ln p,).
Rearranging terms yields:
(9) in A,+, = in A, + c(ln X,+, – in X,)
+ d(ln Z,+, – in Z,)
– (c + d)(ln p,+, – in p,).
Equation (4) is the form of the production
function estimated in the static model and
equation (9) is the model for the dynamic
analysis.
Last, an important issue for policy makers
is how much collective influence school policy
inputs have in explaining variation in student
achievement. We use two procedures to an-
swer this question. As a maximum, or upper
bound, of the collective contribution, we re-
gress the student achievement measure on
only the school policy inputs and take the R2
from this regression as the upper bound. This
is the maximum joint contribution of school
policy inputs because it gives credit to school
policy inputs for effects that, in fact, might be
due to socioeconomic inputs that are merely
correlated with the school inputs.
We calculate the minimum, or lower bound,
of the joint contribution of the school policy
inputs in the following way. First, we regress
the school achievement measure on only the
socioeconomic inputs. We then take the resid-
uals horn this regression and regress them on
the school policy inputs. The sum of squares
due to regression from this residuals regression
divided by the sum of squares total from the
upper bound procedure is the lower bound R2.
This is the minimum joint contribution of
school policy inputs because, this time, all of
the impact from joint correlation between the
school policy inputs and socioeconomic inputs
is attributed to the latter inputs.
Data and Empirical Results
The study is performed using school districts
in North Carolina as the unit of analysis. ThereWalden and Sisak: School Inputs and Educational Outcomes 597


















California Achievement Test, grade 3 reading score
California Achievement Test, grade 3 math score
California Achievement Test, grade 6 reading score
California Achievement Test, grade 6 math score
California Achievement Test, grade 8 reading score
California Achievement Test, grade 8 math score
North Carolina grade 6 writing test score
North Carolina grade 8 writing test score
North Carolina grade 3 science test score
North Carolina grade 6 science test score
North Carolina grade 8 science test score
Algebra 1 test score
Number of high school graduates completing N.C. scholars program courses
Number of graduates completing required UNC admission courses
Number of students grades 9–12 earning 5 of the 22 units required for graduation
Scholastic Aptitude Test verbal score
Scholastic Aptitude Test math score
Source: NorthCarolinaDepartmentof public Institution,North Carolina Report Card, Raleigh,NorthCarolina, 1991,
1992, 1993.
are 129 districts in the state.2 Data were col-
lected for each of these districts for three ac-
ademic years-1989-1990, 1990-1991, and
199 1–1992. Student achievement, non-finan-
cial school policy inputs, and socioeconomic
inputs were taken from annual editions of the
North Carolina Report Card published by the
North Carolina Department of Public Instruc-
2All the districts are public school districts, and
two-thirds are single-county districts. Private and home
schooling are relatively minor, ranging from a low of
0.2 percert to a high of 12 percent of students in the
districts, with the state average being 5.7% (North Car-
olina Department of Public Instruction).
tion. Financial policy inputs were taken from
annual editions of the Statistical Projile, also
published by the North Carolina Department
of Public Instruction.
A feature of our study is the use of multiple
measures of student achievement. Seventeen
alternative measures, listed in Table 1, are
used. Most are scores on standardized tests. A
wide range of school policy inputs, including
the number of teachers, administrators, aides
and other staff, and spending on salaries,
equipment, and supplies, is used in the study.
These are listed and identified in Table 2. Un-
fortunately, one factor we are lacking is teach-
Table 2. School Policy Inputs, North Carolina School Districts
TEACHER Number of teachers
GRAD Number of teachers with a graduate college degree
ADMIN Number of adrninistrators (superintendents, assistant superintendents, principals, as-
sistant principals)
AIDES Number of teacher assistants
SPECIAL Number of specialists (guidance counselors, librarians, audio-visual specialists)
OTSTAFF Number of other staff (technicians, clerical staff, cafeteria workers, janitorial staff)
REALCOMP Spending on employee salaries and benefits (1992 $)
REALEQUIP Spending on instructional equipment (1992 $)
REALSUPP Spending on supplies (1992 $)
REALSER Spending on purchased services (1992 $)
REALOTH Spending on other goods and services (1992 $)
Source: NorthCarolinaDepartmentof Public Instruction,StatisticalProjde, RaIeigh,NorthCarolina,1991, 1992, 1993.598 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1999














Number of non-white pupils
Number of pupils classified as
gifted
Number of pupils classified as
handicapped
Number of pupils receiving free
or reduced h.tnch
Number of dropouts in grades
9–12
Number of pupils absent more
than 14 days during the year
Number of parents with less
than 8th grade education
Number of parents with an 8th
but less than 12th grade educa-
tion
Number of parents with a 12
grade education but no college
education
Number of parents with some
college education
Number of students taking SAT
test (for VERB and MATH
equations only)
Source: NorthCarolinaDepartmentof Public Instruction,
North Carolina Report Card, Raleigh, North Carolina,
1991, 1992, 1993.
er experiences All financial amounts are ex-
pressed in 1992 dollars.
Socioeconomic characteristics of the
school districts’ students and their parents are
given and identified in Table 3.4 Income of
parents was not available, but the number of
pupils receiving a free or reduced school lunch
should be a proxy for this characteristic.
Last, since the data are pooled over three
years, dummy variables are included to control
for year effects. In the static analysis,
YEAR9091 means the observation is from ac-
3Hanushek found a positive effect of teacher ex-
perience on student performance in one-third of the
studies he examined, while Ferguson and Ladd found
no impact of teacher experience.
4The number of pupils (PUPILS) is classified as a
socioeconomic input and not a school policy input be-
cause school districts are more likely to be presented
with the number of students they serve than they are
to select and determine the number of pupils in the
dktrict.
ademic year 1990–91 and YEAR9192 means
the observation is from academic year 199 l–
92. The intercept category is academic year
1989–90, In the dynamic analysis, the dummy
variable DYR9 192 indicates the observation is
measured by the change from academic year
1990–91 to academic year 199 1–92. The in-
tercept category includes the year effect when
the observation is measured from academic
year 1989–90 to academic year 1990–91.
Means, standard errors of means, and rang-
es for all variables in levels (that is, non-log
form) are given in Table 4. Since there are
three years of data for each school district,
there are 387 (129 X 3) observations.
In the static model, each of the 17 student
achievement measures was regressed on the
set of school policy inputs and the socioeco-
nomic characteristics. Since the equations
were estimated in log-linear form, the param-
eter estimates are elasticities.
The results are given in Table 5 and are
summarized in Table 9. Looking first at the
socioeconomic characteristics, the race, in-
come proxy (FREELUN) and education vari-
ables are statistically significant in most of the
equations. NONWHITE is negative and statis-
tically significant in 12 of the 17 equations
with most elasticities in the – 0.02 to – 0.06
ranges FREELUN is negative and statistically
significant in 16 of the 17 equations and has
elasticities in the –0.04 to –0.20 range. Of the
education variables, the high school education
variable (EDU8T0 12) and the highest educa-
tion category (EDUCOL) are the most consis-
tent throughout the equations. EDU8T012 is
negative and statistically significant in 11 of
the 17 equations with elasticities between
–0.02 and –0.20. EDUCOL is positive and
statistically significant in 13 of the 17 equa-
tions with most elasticities ranging from 0.10
to 0.40. Everything else being equal, children
from parents who did not complete high
school perform poorer than children from par-
ents with some college education,
Of the remaining socioeconomic character-
istics, GIFTED, ABSENT, and PUPILS have
the most consistent results. GIFTED is positive
5Ferguson and Ladd found a similar result.Walden and Sisak: School Inputs and Educational Outcomes 599
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics
Standard Error









































































































































































































and statistically significant in nine of the 17 the 17 equations.b PUPILS is positive and sta-
equations, and it is negative and statistically
significant in only two equations. ABSENT is GIt could be arguedthatABSENT is an endoge-
negative and statistically significant in six of nous variable. We use it as an exogenous variable to600 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1999
Table 5. Regression Results for Student Achievement Measures, Static Model






























*** significantat the .01 level.
** ,significantat the .05 level.
* Significantatthe .10 level.








































































































































tistically significant in four of the equations.7
Since in equation 4 the parameter estimate for
PUPILS is multiplied by a negative, this result
means the underlying parameter estimate for
PUPILS [ln(al + az + ... A + b{ + bz+ ... bn)]
is negative. Therefore, in four of the equations,
increasing PUPILS and holding all other inputs
represent student motivation. A high number of ab-
sences can mean a large number of unmotivated stu-
dents who lack the desire to perform on standardized
tests.
7Following equation (5), the parameter estimates
on PUPILS were restricted to equal the sum of the
other parameterestimates.
constant reduces educational outcomes. This
makes sense, as more pupils means educational
inputs are stretched thinner.
Among the school input variables, REAL-
SER, ADMIN, GRAD, SPECIAL, and REAL-
EQUIP have the most consistent impacts on
the various measures of student achievement.
REALSER is negative and statistically signif-
icant in 12 of the 17 equations. GRAD, SPE-
CIAL and REALEQUIP are positive and sta-
tistically significant in seven, six and five,
respectively, of the 17 equations. ADMIN is
positive and statistically significant in nine of
the 17 equations, and negative in three equa-Walden and Sisak: School Inputs and Educational Outcomes 601
Table 5. (Continued)
































































































































































































*** significant at the .01 level.
** Significantatthe .05 level.
* Significantat the .10 level.
N.A. = nonapplicable.
tions. Thus, the findings of the static analysis
do not support the work of Anderson, Shug-
hart, and Tollison (1991), who expect spend-
ing on school administrators to be negatively
related to student performance.
The number of teachers (TEACHER) is
statistically significant in only five equations,
with one positive and four negative signs.
Again, because the coefficient on the number
of teachers is estimated holding the number of
pupils constant, these results are comparable
to testing the impact of the teacher/pupil ratio
by altering the number of teachers. Thus, the
findings are similar to the results of many oth-
er studies which show no major impact of the
number of teachers (or the teacher/pupil ratio)
on student achievement.8
It is interesting to contrast the lack of sig-
nificant impacts for TEACHER to the better
findings for SPECIAL and GRAD in the static
model. The static results suggest that school
districts will have a greater likelihood of im-
8A reviewer suggested thatone explanation for the
weak findings for number of teacher8could be inade-
quate variations in the teacherlpupil ratio: The teacherf
pupil ratio varied from a low of 0.056 to a high of
0.065,602 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1999
Table 5. (Continued)
























































































































































































*** Significantat the .01 level.
** Significantat the .05 level.
* Significantat the .10 level.
N.A. = not applicable.
proving student performance if specialists are
increased or if existing teachers are encour-
aged to attain graduate degrees rather than if
the number of teachers is simply increased.
It is also interesting to note the lack of con-
sistent results for REALCOMP (teacher pay
and benefits). REALCOMPis statistically sig-
nificant in only three equations, and in one of
these the sign is negative.9 The static results
‘As was noted, wedonot have teacher experience
as an explanatory variable. If teacher experience and
teacher compensation are positively correlated, then
the omission of experience will bias upward the coef-
ficients on REALCOME
don’t support the notion of raising teacher pay
as a way of improving student performance.
In the two SAT equations (VERB and
MATH) it is important to control for the num-
ber of test takers because, unlike the other
tests, the SAT is an elective test. It is expected
that the greater the number of test takers, the
lower the average score. In the VERB and
MATH equations the signs on NUMTEST are
negative but not statistically significant.
There are some notable differences in the
results across achievement measure and grade
level. The highest R2’s are for the sixth and
eighth grade CAT reading scores, sixth gradeWalden and Sisak: School Inputs and Educational Outcomes 603
Table 6. Joint Contribution of School Policy
Inputs to Variation in Student Achievement
Measures, Static Analysis
Achievement


















science scores, and for NCSCHOL, UN-
CADM, UNITS5, and VERB, each with R2’
above 0.600. In contrast, among the lowest
R2’s are the equations for North Carolina sixth
and eighth grade writing test scores. These re-
sults make sense if writing tests tend to be
more subjective.
Recent attention has focused on improving
early grades’ educational outcomes. The most
consistent school input performers among the
three third grade scores (CAT3RED,
CAT3MATH, NC3SCI) are GRAD, ADMIN
and AIDES, with each being statistically sig-
nificant in two of the three equations.
How much collective influence do the
school policy inputs have on student achieve-
ment? The results of implementing our lower-
and upper-bound calculations are given in Ta-
ble 6. The numbers are sobering for the impact
schools can have on student achievement. In
the lower-bound calculations, the joint contri-
bution of school policy inputs ranges from 1
percent to 11 percent. In the upper-bound cal-
culations, with three exceptions, the contribu-
tion of school policy inputs ranges from 6 per-
cent to 28 percent. The three exceptions are
NCSCHOL (86 percent), UNCADM (94 per-
cent) and UNITS5 (98 percent). Thus, with
these three exceptions, the most that variation
in school inputs can collectively “explain” is
28 percent of the variation in student achieve-
ment.
Next, the results of the dynamic model are
presented and discussed. Since we have three
years of data for 129 districts, there are 258
two-year comparisons. The regression results
are given in Table 7 and are summarized and
compared to the static results in Table 9.
Clearly the most important determinant of
this year’s test score is last year’s test score.
The lagged value of the test score is positive
and significant in each of the 17 equations, and
in the majority of equations the coefficient is
between 0.7 and unity.
Among the socioeconomic inputs, the
most consistent results are for APUPILS, and
AEDUCOL. The coefficient on APUPILS is
positive and statistically significant in seven of
the 17 equations and not significantly negative
in any equation. In equation 9 the parameter
estimate on APUPILS is multiplied by a neg-
ative. 10 Therefore, our results suggest that,
holding other inputs constant, increases in the
rate of increase of students in a school district
will lead to lower average student achieve-
ment measures next year for seven of the 17
output measures. Notice that three of the seven
significant APUPILS coefficients occur for
third grade test scores.
The coefficient on AGIFTED is negative
and statistically significant in four of the 17
equations. This is contrary to expectations, but
one possible explanation follows. If faster in-
creases in the number of students classified as
gifted in a school district is due not to more
gifted students moving into the district, but is
a result of more existing students being clas-
sified as gifted, then such students may per-
form more poorly on standardized tests as a
result of the time they are “pulled away” from
regular classroom instruction.
10 Ag~i~, the p~dmeter HdUIEikX on AP”plLs
were restricted to equal the sum of the parameteres-
timateson school policy inputs and socioeconomic in-
puts, but not including the parameter estimate on the
lagged score.604 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1999
Table 7. Regression Results for Student Achievement Measures, Dynamic Model





































































































































































*** Significantat the .01 level.
** Significantat the .05 level.
* Significantat the .10 level.
N.A. = not applicable.
The coefficient on AEDUCOL is positive
and significant in six of the 17 equations. All
of the significant coefficients occur for ele-
mentary school scores. The coefficient on
ANONWHITE is statistically significant in
only two of the 17 equations, with one coef-
ficient being positive and one being negative.
Among the school input variables, the most
noteworthy result is for ATEACHER. The co-
efficient on ATEACHER is positive and sta-
tistically significant in six of the 17 equations
and significantly negative in none. This is dra-
matically different from the results in the static
analysis, where the coefficient on TEACHER
was positive and statistically significant in
only one equation. The dynamic results sug-
gest that districts which increase the number
of teachers at a faster rate than other districts
will see a greater increase in test scores for six
of the 17 performance measures.
Among the other school inputs, the most
consistent results are for AGRAD, AADMIN,
and ASPECIAL. The variable AGRAD is sta-
tistically significant in six of the equations,
with five of the coefficients being negative.
This is almost the reverse of the findings in
the static model. In contrast, the results for
AADMIN and ASPECIAL are similar, al-Walden and Sisak: School Inputs and Educational Outcomes
Table 7. (Continued)
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*** Significantat the .01 level.
** Significantat the .05 level.
* Significantat the .10 level.
N.A. = not applicable.
though not as strong, as in the static analysis.
Both have positive and statistically significant
parameter estimates in four equations, and sta-
tistically negative estimates in none.
The same procedures that were used in the
static analysis to estimate the total contribution
of school policy inputs were also applied to
the dynamic analysis. 11 Upper- and lower-
bound estimates for the total contribution of
change in school policy inputs to this year’s
achievement scores, given last year’s scores,
11 In these calculations,the lagged achievement
score wasincludedwiththesocioeconomic inputs.
are given in Table 8. The results again suggest
the relative small contribution of school policy
inputs, with most total upper-bound contribu-
tions being under 10 percent.
Conclusions and Implications
This paper has examined the relationships be-
tween various measures of student perfor-
mance and school policy inputs and socioeco-
nomic inputs in North Carolina school
districts. The relationships were examined in
two ways. First, a static analysis was per-
formed in which the data for three years were606 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1999
Table 7. (Continued)
































































































































































































*** significant at the .01 level.
** Significantatthe .05 level.
* Significantat the .10 level.
N.A, = not applicable,
pooled and the “level” of student perfor-
mance was related to the “levels” of school
policy inputs and socioeconomic inputs. Sec-
ond, a dynamic analysis was conducted in
which this year’s student performance was re-
lated to last year’s performance and the chang-
es in school policy inputs and socioeconomic
inputs.
The results of the two analyses provide a
number of conclusions and implications. First,
the results varied by the measure of student
performance used. For example, in the dynam-
ic analysis, increases in the rate of increase of
teachers were associated with increases in
sixth grade reading and math test scores but
not with changes in third grade reading and
math test scores. This means it is potentially
misleading for analysts and policymakers to
base general conclusions about how school in-
puts affect student performance from results
derived from one student achievement mea-
sure,
Second, substantial differences were found
for specific variables in the static and dynamic
analyses. The most notable differences were
for school policy inputs. For example, in the
static analysis, little impact on student perfor-
mance measures was found for the number ofWalden and Sisak: School Inputs and Educational Outcomes 607
Table 8. Joint Contribution of School Policy
Inputs to Variation in Student Achievement
Measures, Dynamic Analysis
Achievement



































teachers, whereas significant positive impacts
were found for the number of teachers with a
graduate degree, the number of administrators,
the number of specialists, and spending on
equipment.
In the dynamic analysis, the findings were
different. No impacts were found for changes
in equipment spending, and faster increases
in the number of teachers with a graduate de-
gree had a negative impact on student per-
formance in five of the 17 equations. In con-
trast, in six of the equations, faster increases
in the number of teachers were positively as-
sociated with student performance. More rap-
id increases in the number of administrators
and specialists continued to have positive im-
pacts on student achievement, but in fewer
equations. Therefore, to the extent that the
dynamic analysis is superior because of the
way it handles unmeasurable innate student
abilities, researchers and policymakers may
be worried about results from static analyses.
A third conclusion of the study concerns
the relative contribution of school policy in-
puts and socioeconomic characteristics to stu-
dent achievement (Table 8). Measures of the
Table 9. Summary of Regression Results for
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total contribution of all school inputs together
revealed that, at a maximum, they could gen-
erally account for 20 percent of the variation
in student achievement measures in the static
analysis and 10 percent in the dynamic anal-
ysis. These findings suggest student perfor-
mance is heavily dominated by socioeconomic
inputs and unobservable innate abilities of stu-
dents. They also raise a question about how
scarce public resources can best be allocated
to improve student performance. Would
school outcomes be more improved if margin-
al public resources are added to school inputs608 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1999
or if these resources are used to improve the
socioeconomic status of students? The results
reported in this study suggest the second
choice.
There are three major implications of this
study for public school decision-makers. First,
the study has demonstrated the usefulness of
dynamic analysis in measuring student pro-
gress and the relationships between inputs and
student achievement. Again, to the extent that
dynamic analysis controls for unobservable in-
nate student abilities better than static analysis,
dynamic analysis is the preferred method for
both measuring student performance and mea-
suring the relationship between performance
and school inputs.
School policymakers are increasingly be-
ing held accountable for student achievement
and for effective allocation of resources. For
example, in North Carolina, school principals
in many districts have some discretion over
how resources are allocated; that is, princi-
pals can spend marginal dollars on additional
teachers or additional teaching materials.
However, school principals can also be re-
moved if their students don’t perform to cer-
tain levels. In this environment it becomes
very important to properly measure student
achievement and relationships between
achievement and inputs, Fortunate y, North
Carolina is applying a dynamic method, mea-
suring the change in student achievement
scores and relating those changes to changes
in inputs.
A second policy implication concerns what
the study reveals about which school inputs
are most effective in improving student per-
formance. Using the dynamic model as the
better approach, the answer is the number of
teachers. In six of the 17 student achievement
equations, faster rates of increase in the num-
ber of teachers, with the number of pupils held
constant, were associated with improved stu-
dent performance. In no dynamic equations
were greater increases in the number of teach-
ers associated with poorer student perfor-
mance.
A third policy implication is that school of-
ficials, politicians, and parents need to be re-
alistic and modest in their expectations for
what schools can deliver. The study found that
school policy inputs, collectively, have a rel-
atively small impact on student achievement.
At best, school inputs can have marginal ef-
fects on student performance.
Several extensions are recommended for
this topic in future research. Most states col-
lect data similar to those used in this study, so
the study could be replicated in other states. It
would be helpful if more detailed information
on school policy inputs could be gathered and
used, such as spending on computers and tech-
nology and on specific teaching materials.
Also, it would be interesting to repeat the anal-
ysis at the building level rather than the dis-
trict level.
Last, this study has focused on the techni-
cal efficiency of the production function, that
is, what inputs have the most impact on stu-
dent achievement? The next step would be to
also consider economic efficiency, that is, cal-
culating the costs of changing alternative in-
puts necessary to change student achievement
by a given amount.
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